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Abstract
The paper proposes a novel model for the prediction of bank fail-
ures, on the basis of both macroeconomic and bank-specific microe-
conomic factors. As bank failures are rare, in the paper we apply
a regression method for binary data based on extreme value theory,
which turns out to be more effective than classical logistic regression
models, as it better leverages the information in the tail of the default
distribution. The application of this model to the occurrence of bank
defaults in a highly bank dependent economy (Italy) shows that, while
microeconomic factors as well as regulatory capital are significant to
explain proper failures, macroeconomic conditions are relevant only
when failures are defined not only in terms of actual defaults but also
in terms of mergers and acquisitions. In terms of prediction effective-
ness, the model based on extreme value theory outperforms classical
logistic regression models.
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1 Introduction
In the latest financial crisis, started in 2007, the core capital of banks
has proved to be insufficient to cover impairment losses arising from
loans and security portfolios. Consequently, several banks have been
strengthened their capital base or reduced their asset exposure. Other
banks have been bailed out by state aids or have defaulted. To reduce
the risk of similar crises in the future and to enhance the resilience of
the banking sector, a new regulatory framework, the so-called Basel
III package, has been proposed, implying more stringent capital re-
quirements for financial institutions (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2011). The application and the supervision of the new
regulatory framework increases the importance of having reliable sta-
tistical models that, given an appropriate definition of distress of a
bank, can identify their most likely predictor variables, thereby pro-
viding early warning indicators of crisis.
For listed banks, both the definition of distress and the set predic-
tors are naturally provided by financial markets: shares, bonds and
credit default swap prices data are available with a high frequency and
can thus be employed to capture in advance “early warning” signals.
However, the majority of banks are not listed, in particular the small-
est, often the most fragile as only a weak“safety net” is available for
them. The issue thus becomes that of finding a definition of distress,
and a correlated set of predictors, not based on financial market infor-
mation but, rather, on microeconomic and macroeconomic data, less
frequent, but closer to the fundamentals of a bank and of the economy
in which the bank operates.
In this paper we aim to build a predictive model of bank distress,
based on universally available information: microeconomic data from
the balance sheet of a bank and macroeconomic information on the
region where the bank operates. The advantage of such a model is
clearly its universal applicability; its main weakness is the fact that
the data on which its is based are not frequently updated, as they are
available at most with a quarterly periodicity.
Note however that also financial market models, when available,
have their pitfalls. Market information is often dependent not on
the fundamentals of a bank or of the economy in which it operates,
but, rather, on the market sentiment, often caused by speculative
or irrational behaviours. Indeed, when Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy in September 2008 some analysts were almost caught by
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surprise: two weeks prior to bankruptcy, the official Moodys KMV
one-year Estimated Default Frequency (EDF) based on financial mar-
ket data, for Lehman Brothers was only at 0.62% (Fantazzini and
Maggi, 2013).
A further problem is that, while in financial market models distress
can be defined in quantitative terms, such as the share price going
below a certain threshold (the default threshold in Merton’s model,
1974 or the market VaR as in Acharya et al. (2010), for the predictive
models to consider a precise definition of distress is more controversial.
A very objective definition (such as the actual default of a bank) may
take too long to be observed and, often, is not observable or observed
in a very limited number of instances. Wider definitions of distress,
that include situations of “de facto” default, such as induced mergers,
state aid interventions or recommendations of supervisory authorities,
may shorten the time span and increment the number of observed
distressed banks, but at the price of an increased subjectivity.
In the attempt of overcoming the above difficulties, in this paper
we suggest a novel predictive method of bank failures. On one hand,
we employ two alternative “objective” definitions of distress, based on
the actual codification of the event: “default of the bank” and “de-
fault or merger and acquisition with other banks”. On the other hand,
we apply Calabrese and Osmetti (2013)’s generalised linear model for
binary data, that explains the distress event as a rare tail event of a
latent variable, function of the available micro and macroeconomic in-
formation, through a Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) link function.
In such a way, while maintaining objectivity of the distress definition,
we make an efficient use of the available information, leveraging what
contained in the tail of the default distribution, rather than in its core.
Our proposal will be tested on an economy that is highly depen-
dent on the banking sector: the Italian economy, characterised by a
large number of unlisted and small banks, rather crucial for worldwide
systemic risks. From Bureau Van Djyk’s Bankscope database we shall
consider the application of the GEV model to 783 Italian banks, ob-
served over the period 1996-2011. The explanatory variables of this
model are addressed directly by appropriate banking regulation and
supervision authorities under the CAMELS1 framework, which is ap-
plied in the US and has been adapted elsewhere. Furthermore, we
choose Italian macroeconomic indicators for the GEV model in com-
1Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management soundness, Earnings and profitability,
Liquidity, Sensitivity to market risk (CAMELS).
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pliance with some studies in the literature (Arena, 2008).
For the definition of bank failure, some authors exclude mergers
from it (Arena, 2008), other authors include them (Bongini et al.,
2001; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). This contradictory indications im-
ply that it is necessary to check the robustness of our results to the
inclusion or exclusion of mergers and acquisitions from the definition of
bank failure (default). In this analysis we shall obtain, for the Italian
banking sector, that the two definitions lead to different determinants
of default. By excluding bank mergers and acquisitions, accounting
variables are pivotal to explain bank distress. On the contrary, by
including them, only macroeconomic variables become relevant.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review that sets the background of our model. The methodological
proposal is described in Section 3. Empirical evidences, which illus-
trate the actual implementation of the model to the Italian banking
sector, are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 contains some
concluding remarks and future directions of research.
2 Literature review
The study of bank failures is important for two reasons. First, an
understanding of the factors related to bank failure enables regula-
tory authorities to supervise banks more efficiently. In other words,
if supervisors can detect problems early enough, regulatory actions
can be taken, to prevent a bank from failing and, therefore, to reduce
the costs of its bail-in, faced by shareholders, bondholders and depos-
itors; as well as those of its bail-out, faced by the governments and,
therefore, by the taxpayers. Second, the failure of a bank very likely
induces failures of other banks or of parts of the financial system as a
whole. Understanding the determinants of a single bank failure may
thus help to understand the determinants of financial systemic risks,
were they due to microeconomic, idiosyncratic factors or to macroe-
conomic imbalances. When problems are detected, their causes can
be removed or isolated, to limit “contagion effects”.
The literature on predictive models for single bank failures is rel-
atively recent: until the 1990s most authors emphasize the absence
of default risk of a bank (see e.g. Gup, 1998; Roth, 1994), in the
presence of a generalised expectation of state interventions. However,
in the last years we have witnessed the emergence of financial crisis
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in different areas of the world, and a correlated emphasis on systemic
financial risks. Related to this, there have been many developments of
the international financial regulation, aimed at mitigating such risks.
In addition, government themselves are less willing than before to
save banks, partly for their financial shortages and partly for a grow-
ing negative sentiment from the public opinion. As a consequence of
all of these aspects, the very recent years are seeing a growing body
of literature on bank failures, and systemic risks originated from such
them.
The studies on bank failures can be classified into three main
streams: financial market models, scoring models and macroeconomic
models.
Financial market models originate from the seminal paper of Mer-
ton (1974), in which the market value of a bank’s assets, typically
modelled as a diffusion process, is insufficient to meet its liabilities.
Due to its practical limitations, Merton’s model has been evolved into
a reduced form (see e.g. Vasicek, 1984), leading to a widespread diffu-
sion of the resulting KMV model, and the related implementation in
Basel’s credit portfolio model. For a review of this evolution see, for
example, the book by Resti and Sironi (2007). In order to implement
market models, diffusion process parameters and, therefore, bank de-
fault probabilities can be obtained on the basis of share price data that
can be collected almost in real time from financial markets. Market
data are relatively easy to collect, are public, and are quite objective.
On the other hand, they may not reflect the true fundamentals of
the underlying financial institutions, and may lead to a biased esti-
mation of the probability of failure. This bias may be stronger when
the probability of multiple failures are to be estimated, as it occurs in
systemic risk. Indeed, the recent paper by Idier et al. (2012) shows
that market models have been proven not much reliable in predictive
terms. Fantazzini and Maggi (2013) show, in a similar experiment,
that market models may be good in very short-term predictions, but
not in medium and long-term ones.
The diffusion of corporate scoring models, that followed the sem-
inal paper by Altman (1968) has induced the production of some
scoring models for banks themselves: noticeable examples are Sinkey
(1975), Tam and Kiang (1992), Rose and Kolari (1985), Cole and
Hunter (1998). The development of the Basel regulation (www.bis.org)
and the recent financial crisis have further boosted the literature on
scoring models for banking failure predictions. Recent examples in-
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clude Arena (2008), Davis and Karim (2008) who use logit mod-
els; Vazquez and Federico (2012) who use a probit model; Gomez-
Gonzalez and Kiefer (2007) who use a hazard function ap-
proach and Klomp and de Haan (2012) who use a principal compo-
nent factor approach.
The emergence of systemic risks has also directed the attention on
macroeconomic models to predict bank failures, especially for those
countries whose economies are heavily dependent on banks. As in
Merton’s reduced form model, the main intuition behind these models
is to decompose failure risk into an idiosyncratic component, that can
be studied using microeconomic data, and a systematic component,
that can be addressed with macroeconomic data. See, for example,
the papers by Koopman et al. (2012) and, more recently, Mare (2012)
and Kanno (2013) who applied this kind of models respectively, to the
Italian and Japanese banking systems. An interesting, and comple-
mentary approach, is suggested in Kenny et al. (2012) who suggest
employing economists’ opinions as expert assessments of risks.
A different approach, somewhat standing between the previous
ones, based on the capital at risk reported by banks in their financial
statements, is provided by the Symbol model of De Lisa et al (2011).
This approach inverts the Vasicek model Basel II formula (Vasicek,
1984) so to obtain, for each bank, the probability of default that cor-
responds to the amount of regulatory capital set aside for the coverage
of financial risks. The advantage of this approach is an estimate of
the default probability that takes into account the actual riskiness of
the loan assets of a bank. However, the estimated capital at risk is a
measure that depends on the chosen internal model, as well as on the
strategies of a bank and, therefore, the model may not be fully ade-
quate for external early warning monitoring (see for instance Berger
et al., 2008, for a discussion on how capital ratios can be managed
by banks). In any case, simulation based approaches, as the Symbol
model, are growing in importance, following the regulatory empha-
sis on dynamic stress tests of banking asset quality and capital, as
emphasised in the recent paper by Halaj (2013).
A related stream of literature is that on systemic risk, which is
very recent, and follows closely the developments of the recent finan-
cial crisis, started in 2007. A comprehensive review is provided in
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) who also provide a historical com-
parison of different crisis. Specific measures of systemic risk have been
proposed, in particular, by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya
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et al. (2010), Brownless and Engle (2011), Huang et al. (2011), Billio
et al. (2011) and, from a different perspective, Segoviano and Good-
hart (2009). All of these approaches are built on financial market
price information, on the basis of which they lead to the estimation
of appropriate quantiles of the estimated loss probability distribution
of a financial institution, conditional on a crash event on the financial
market. Market models, however, do not capture the determinants
of single bank failures and this is even more true for systemic fail-
ures, whose determinants are to be found in common idiosyncratic
risk factors and/or common macroeconomic causes, as illustrated, for
example, in the recent paper by Idier et al. (2013).
In this paper we aim to provide a model for the estimation of
single bank failures, that can be universally applied to all banks, that
can take into account both microeconomic and macroeconomic data.
Statistical scoring models appear a natural choice for this objective.
3 Methodology
Scoring models for the estimation of bank defaults have two main
preliminary choices to be made: which distress definition to employ
and which explanatory variables to use as potential predictors of such
distress.
Concerning the former, non financial scoring models typically use
an objective measure of distress, which is related to the event of a
company not paying its obligations in time. For banks this definition
cannot be employed, but other definitions do exist, especially from a
normative viewpoint. For example, the Bureau Van Djyk’s Bankscope
database, which we shall employ in this paper, defines a bank in de-
faut when it is in at least one of the following states: bankruptcy,
dissolution or in liquidation. For some authors (Bongini et al., 2001;
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999; Vazquez and Federico, 2012), banks that
were merged or acquired by another banks can also be included in
the definition of failure. However, mergers and acquisition might have
been carried out for strategic aims rather than for insolvency rea-
sons (Arena, 2008). Other authors include in the definition of distress
state aid and government intervention (see e.g. Buehler et al., 2009
and Brown and Dinc, 2009). The definition of state aid is indeed
quite subjective and, probably, this enlargement has to be evaluated
as a function of the regulatory framework of the country to which
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it is applied. Last, it should be mentioned that some authors use,
rather than a distress binary variable, a continuous one, expressed
in terms of (lacking) capital, as in Merton’s model (see e.g. Memmel
and Raupach, 2009 and Maurin and Toivanen, 2012 ). It must be said,
however, that this approach is fine when the aim is regulatory cap-
ital itself, otherwise capital should be maintained as an explanatory
variable, given its endogeneous nature.
Concerning the definition of predictors, both microeconomic data,
obtained from the balance sheet of a bank, and macroeconomic data,
relative to the country in which the bank operates, may be consid-
ered. Some authors (e.g. Arena, 2008; Bongini et al., 2001; Gonzalez-
Hermosillo, 1999; Mannasooa and Mayes, 2009) claim that only mi-
croeconomic indicators should be used, such as those addressed di-
rectly by appropriate banking regulation and supervision authorities
under the CAMELS2 framework, which is applied in the US and has
been adapted elsewhere. Other microeconomic indicators can also be
used: for example, Bongini et al. (2002) and Carapeto et al. (2010)
compare different sets of indicators and regulatory measures and con-
clude that there is not a single answer but, very likely, different sets of
indicators may be used simultaneously, depending on the availability
of good quality data. It should also be mentioned that some authors
suggest, given the very large number of indicators of banking distress,
to combine them through a principal components or factor analytic
approach (see, for instance, Canbas et al., 2005, Klomp and de Haan,
2012, Billio et al. 2011): this has the disadvantage of being a pure
exploratory approach, not suited for predictive purposes, as in our cur-
rent context. On the other hand, other authors (Arena, 2008) show
that macroeconomic conditions in the markets where a bank operates
also appears to affect the probability of bank failure, and, therefore,
should be included. Banking crises tend to erupt when the macroe-
conomic environment is weak, particularly when growth is low and
inflation is high.
In this paper we will consider two alternative definitions of bank
failure: one that includes only actual defaults, as previously defined,
and one that adds to them mergers and acquisition events. We will
not include state aids in the definition of distress, due to the subjec-
tivity of this information. Furthermore, in the Italian banking system
that we are going to consider in the application, only four Italian
2Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management soundness, Earnings and profitability,
Liquidity, Sensitivity to market risk (CAMELS)
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banks have received state aid in the recent crisis, and for very limited
amounts (relatively to their asset sizes). Concerning predictors, ours
will be chosen according to the CAMELS framework, as well as from
the current Basel regulatory framework, so to take into account bank
specific conditions as well as the regulatory environment. In addition,
we will include macroeconomic variables into the model, along with
microeconomic variables, as in the recent literature (see, for example
Maurin and Toivanen, 2012).
We can proceed now with model specification. The most com-
monly used model for credit scoring applications is logistic regression
(see e.g., Altman, 1968 and, for bank default prediction, Arena, 2008,
Bongini et al., 2001, Mannasooa and Mayes, 2009). Logistic regression
models are generalised linear models (see e.g. McCullagh and Nelder,
1989), specified by a Bernoulli response random variable and a logis-
tic link function, which relates a function of the expected value of the
response variable to a linear combination of the available predictor
variables. In our context, the event “failure of a bank”, as previosuly
defined, can be represented by a Bernoulli random variable Yi with a
parameter pii that indicates the probability of failure of a given bank,
for i = 1, 2, ..., n banks under analysis. The logistic link can then be
specified as follows:
logit(pii) = ln(
pii
1− pii ) = β0 +
p∑
j=1
βjxji = ηi,
for j = 1, 2, ..., p predictor variables and for all i = 1, 2, ..., n banks
under examination.
From the previous expression the predicted failure probability for
a bank can be obtained as:
pii = 1/(1 + exp(ηi)).
Details on estimation methods and inferential procedures for gen-
eralised linear models and, therefore, for logistic regression models,
can be found in McCullagh and Nelder (1989).
There is one main drawback associated with the application of
logistic regression models to bank failure prediction: the number of
observed failures is usually very small. Hence, the use of the logistic
link function may not be appropriate because of its symmetry around
0.5, which implies that the predicted default probability in the above
expression approaches zero at the same rate as it approaches one. In
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other words, these models assign the same importance to the char-
acteristics of “good” and “bad” banks, ignoring the rarity of bank
failures. This is not ideal, as the characteristics of failures are more
informative than those of non-defaults and, consequently, pii will be
underestimated (Calabrese and Osmetti, 2013). The same problem
holds for probit link models and, more generally, to all symmetric link
functions for binary response variables. This drawback suggests using
an asymmetric link function, as proposed by Calabrese and Osmetti
(2013) and Wang and Dey (2010).
The main idea behind Calabrese and Osmetti (2013)’s proposal
is to concentrate estimation efforts on the tail of the distribution,
adopting a link function that lets the predicted default probability to
approach one slower than it approaches zero. To achieve this aim, Cal-
abrese and Osmetti (2013) suggest using the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of a Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) random
variable as a link function in a generalised linear model for Bernoulli
response variables.
Embrechts et al. (1997) and Dowd (2002) give an extensive overview
of extreme value theory for risk management, which is indeed a ro-
bust framework to analyse the tail behaviour of distributions. The
Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) is a very flexible model and its
cumulative distribution function is given by
F (x) = exp
{
−
[
1 + τ
(
x− µ
σ
)]−1/τ}
defined on SX = {x : 1 + τ(x− µ)/σ > 0}.
Note that, in the above definition, there are three unknown param-
eters: τ , the tail parameter; µ, the location parameter and σ(> 0), the
scale parameter. Some well-known distributions can be obtained for
different values of the tail parameter τ : for τ > 0 the Fre´chet distri-
bution, for τ < 0 the Weibull distribution and for τ → 0 the Gumbel
distribution.
The GEV regression model proposed by Calabrese and Osmetti
(2013) is defined by a link function that corresponds to the inverse
cumulative function of the GEV distribution, that can be called GEV
regression model or “gevit”, in analogy with the “logit”:
gevit(pii) =
−ln(pii)−τ − 1
τ
= β0 +
p∑
j=1
βjxji = ηi,
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for j = 1, 2, ..., p predictor variables and i = 1, 2, ..., n banks under
examination.
From the previous expression the predicted default probability of
a bank can be obtained as the cumulative distribution function of the
GEV, calculated in correspondence with the oberved linear combina-
tion of the predictor variables ηi:
pii = exp{−[1 + τηi]−1/τ}, (3.1)
which exists only when 1 + τηi > 0.
Clearly, the above expression is asymmetric and, therefore, under-
estimation of the default probability may be overcome. In addition,
the proposed model is rather general: depending on the value of τ ,
several special cases can be recovered; for example, when τ → 0 the
GEV random variable follows a Gumbel distribution and its cumula-
tive distribution is the log-log function, which gives rise to the log-log
generalised linear model (Agresti, 2002).
Note that the construction of the gevit model proposed is similar to
that of the probit model, in which the cumulative distribution function
of the Gaussian distribution is used, rather than that of the GEV.
However, as already mentioned, the probit predictive default curve is
symmetric as well as the logit one and, therefore, it would not solve
our problem.
As the log-likelihood derivatives of the gevit model does not have
closed form, maximum likelihood estimators need to be obtained nu-
merically, using iterative optimisation algorithms. Such algorithms
have been developed and implemented in a publicly available soft-
ware: the R package BGEVA (Calabrese et al., 2013). This package
uses the penalized maximum likelihood method (Ruppert et al., 2003),
employed in semiparametric regression. By introducing smooth func-
tions in the regression model, the penalty matrices remove the part of
smooth term complexity which has no support from the data. To ob-
tain the penalized maximum likelihood estimates, the BGEVA package
exploits the trust region algorithm (Nocedal and Wright, 2006).
Note that the above optimisation algorithms, like many others,
requires the specification of initial values to be used in an iterative
scheme. In the BGEVA package, the initial values for the parameter
vector β can be obtained from the estimates of the logistic regression
model. This method is applied for different values of τ and the ones
with the best predictive accuracy can be chosen.
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To summarise, parameter estimation can be performed, with the
previous caveats, within the context of generalised linear models. This
implies that the ouputs of the analysis can be read off as usually, and
this is an important advantage for model users. In addition, differently
from what suggested by the literature on ”adjusted” logistic models
(see e.g. King and Zeng, 2001), no (subjective) correction factors need
to be specified.
From an interpretational viewpoint, because of the structure of
the gevit predictive default probability, the effect sign of the predic-
tors is the opposite from what appears from the standard output.
This because, in the interpretation of the regression parameters β, if
the parameter βj is positive and all the other parameters are fixed,
by increasing the j-th regressor, xj , the estimated predictive failure
probability pii decreases.
We remark that GEV models, like logistic and probit
models, are static in time. Hazard models generalise static
models by explicitly accounting for time, so that the whole
process of deterioration of creditworthiness can be followed.
In addition, hazard models allow nonlinear effects of the ex-
planatory variables on the dependent variable, which is the
time to bank failure after the occurrence of a negative shock
(Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer, 2009). While GEV models are
also able to capture non linear effects of the explanatory
variables on the default event, they are static, as their aim
is the prediction of the failure point, independently of where
it occurs in time. For this reason in this paper we shall com-
pare the performances of our proposal to those of the most
popular static model, the classical logistic regression model.
The two models will be compared by calculating the correspond-
ing ROC Curve, and the associated AUC and H measures (see e.g.
Hand, 2009 and Hand, 2010). To attain more precise conclusions, we
will consider whether the reported differences in AUC and/or H are
significant, within a formal statistical hypotheses testing procedure.
More precisely, following Hanley and McNeil (1983), we will con-
sider the test statistic
Z =
Tl − Tg
sd(Tl − Tg)
where Tl and Tg are the AUC or the H measures for the logistic model
(Tl) and the GEV model (Tg), respectively. Unlike Hanley and McNeil
(1983), the numerator and the denominator of the previous statistic
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test will be, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the
difference Tl − Tg computed on the M bootstrap replicates.
4 Empirical evidences
Financial statements for banks and financial institutions can be ob-
tained from Bankscope, a comprehensive database of balance sheet
and income statement data for individual banks across the world pro-
vided by the private company Bureau Van Dijk. The information
made available to us covers the period 1996-2011, with observations
on an annual basis.
We have decided to concentrate our analysis on the Italian banking
system. All Italian banks with a Bankscope account are 1,053, of
which only for 783 banks all data are available. Missing observations
typically concern small banks, whose characteristics are very similar
to many other banks with complete data: we do not see a selection
bias issue, in this respect. The Italian banking system is particularly
suited to illustrate the behaviour of a predictive scoring model for
bank defaults. It is a market that presents a low concentration of
operators, compared to other countries: there are many banks, most
of which are not publicly traded: currently less than 20 out of 1,053.
Italian Banks can be grouped, structurally, into three main groups: a)
retail community banks, small and operating at a very local level, with
few branches, with most of them belonging to a federation umbrella;
b) retail community banks, operating at the regional or macro regional
level, with a reasonable size, often listed. Although characterised by
a bigger size, the governance of such banks is similar to that of the
smaller community banks, with many shareholders, powered with per-
capita voting rights; c) commercial banks, which are of a bigger size
and are classical public companies. The biggest of them have, as main
shareholders, foundations that are controlled by regional governments.
Some others have, as main shareholders, other European banks and
insurance companies.
From the previous description it is clear that the Italian banking
system is quite entropic and, therefore, interesting, from our statisti-
cal point of view. It would very much less so, from a financial market
based modelling perspective. Furthermore, it must be added that, in
Italy: 99% of the non financial companies are small and medium en-
terprises, with many of them family based; most companies, not only
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SMEs but also large ones, have a very limited access to financial mar-
kets and, therefore, depend heavily on bank credit; Italy has a high
national debt, currently around 130% of the GDP, and a large pro-
portion of it is owned by Italian banks. These three additional factors
explain why the Italian financial system is heavily bank-dependent
and why an approach based on financial market data would not be
effective.
During the latest financial crisis, banks have been suffering consid-
erably. Differently from what happened in other European countries,
state aid has been very limited and no bail outs have been undertaken;
however, in the recent years provisions and write-offs of loan credits
have increased dramatically and banks do require capital injections.
These are not easy to obtain, as the country solvency risk and finan-
cial frictions in Europe has increased cost and availability of funding.
Notwithstanding the difficult situation, few banks have gone default,
and these are to be found mainly within the small community banks.
The action of the regulator, the Bank of Italy, has always been firm
in terms of monitoring the system and this may explain why the sys-
tem is resilient. However, as the situation is getting worse and the
European banking union is approaching, it makes a lot of sense to
study the characteristics of the italian banking system, with the aim
of understanding which are the most likely factors of default of Italian
banks, so to have better and more timely prevention tools. This is the
applied scope of this paper.
The early warning indicators of bank failure present in Bankscope
can be divided into two sets: those that are bank specific and macroe-
conomic or external factors that affect all banks. Overall there is no
universal set of indicators used across previous studies, although there
is more commonality over broad-based macroeconomic variables, such
as GDP and inflation indexes (see e.g. Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009).
In contrast, the set of bank-specific variables is less uniform across
studies.
As discussed, financial ratios associated with the CAMELS rating
system can be used to measure bank-level fundamentals related to
the asset and liability structure of a bank, assuming that these ratios
capture the market, credit, operational, and liquidity risk faced by
banks. We decided to use these ratios as explanatory variables of bank
failure in our model and, therefore, whether they are significant, can
be interpreted as determinants of such failure. In addition, because of
the importance and impact of capital requirements, we have inserted
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the capital ratios monitored by Basel regulation in the model. Last,
the most important macroeconomic variables have also been included
and, therefore, our model mixes microeconomic with macroeconomic
explanatory factors.
In compliance with Basel regulation, our model attempts to predict
bank failure one year in advance. Therefore, all explanatory variables
are evaluated one year in advance, with respect to the time in which
the bank failure response variable is evaluated.
High correlation among variables is a drawback, since it leads to
multicollinearity in the regression models. In order to measure the
impact of multicollinearity, we have computed the Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF) for each explanatory variable. From the 14 explanatory
variables that were initially chosen, those with a VIF higher than 5
were removed, leading to 11 remaining predictors.
With data on such predictors, and on the response variable, for all
banks and time periods considered, we have applied both the logis-
tic regression model and the GEV regression model described in the
previous Section. We have considered both definitions of bank failure:
one “restricted”, that includes only defaults and one that includes,
besides defaults, also banks that have been merged or acquired. Since
the observed percentage of defaults for the restricted definition is equal
to 4.469%, the logistic regression model is unsuitable to correctly clas-
sify “good” and “bad” banks. Hence, we report only the estimation
results of the GEV regression model.
Table 1 shows our obtained estimates, when the definition of bank
failure includes only defaulted banks: bankrupted, dissolved or in liq-
uidation, according to Bankscope. Conversely, Table 2 shows the ob-
tained results by including mergers and acquisitions in the definition
of bank failure.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 about here
Comparing the results in Table 1 with those in Table 2, the first
relevant finding is that financial and capital ratios are significant to
explain the first definition of default but not for the second defini-
tion. This outcome confirms that mergers and acquisitions might have
been carried out for strategic rather than for distress reasons. The re-
sults for the larger definition of default seem, on the other hand, be
strongly influenced by the economic cycle, since Table 2 shows that
most macroeconomic variables (with the exclusion of the interest rate)
are important for the second definition of bank failure. To complete
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Variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
τ -1.421 0.673
Intercept 59.082 34.570 1.709 0.087.
Asset quality
Loan loss Reserves/Loans 2.640 0.085 3.101 0.001 **
Loans/Total assets -0.003 0.001 -2.088 0.036 *
Capital
Equity/Total assets 0.389 0.141 2.748 0.006 **
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.810 0.274 2.950 0.003 **
Total capital ratio 0.413 0.211 1.953 0.050 .
Liquidity
Liquid Assets/Total Deposits -0.064 0.027 -2.347 0.018 *
Operations
Return On Assets 0.072 0.028 2.531 0.011 *
Macroeconomic variables
GDP rate 37.290 38.962 0.957 0.338
Inflation rate -0.580 0.305 -1.902 0.057 .
Unemployment rate -1.591 1.008 -1.579 0.114
Interest rate -0.737 0.695 -1.060 0.289
Table 1: Signif. codes: 0 “***” 0.001 “**” 0.01 “*” 0.05 “.” 0.1 “ ” 1 Parame-
ter estimates on 783 Italian banks from 1996 to 2011. The definition of failure
includes bankruptcy (no bank), dissolved (16 banks) and in liquidation (19
banks).
the picture, note that Tier 1 capital ratio is the only microeconomic
variable that is significant (at 5%) for the “enriched” definition of de-
fault that includes mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, the
inflation rate is the only macroeconomic variable that is significant (at
5%) for the “restricted” definition of default.
To understand how the explanatory variables affect bank distress,
we recall that, when the parameter estimate is positive, by increasing
16
Variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
τ -1.421 0.673
Intercept 59.082 34.570 1.709 0.087.
Asset quality
Loan loss Reserves/Loans 2.640 0.085 3.101 0.001 **
Loans/Total assets -0.003 0.001 -2.088 0.036 *
Capital
Equity/Total assets 0.389 0.141 2.748 0.006 **
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.810 0.274 2.950 0.003 **
Total capital ratio 0.413 0.211 1.953 0.050 .
Liquidity
Liquid Assets/Total Deposits -0.064 0.027 -2.347 0.018 *
Operations
Return On Assets 0.072 0.028 2.531 0.011 *
Macroeconomic variables
GDP rate 37.290 38.962 0.957 0.338
Inflation rate -0.580 0.305 -1.902 0.057 .
Unemployment rate -1.591 1.008 -1.579 0.114
Interest rate -0.737 0.695 -1.060 0.289
Table 2: Signif. codes: 0 “***” 0.001 “**” 0.01 “*” 0.05 “.” 0.1 “ ” 1 Parame-
ter estimates on 783 Italian banks from 1996 to 2011. The definition of failure
includes bankruptcy (no bank), dissolved (16 banks) and in liquidation (19
banks).
the corresponding variable and fixing all the others, the estimate of
the probability of bank default decreases and, conversely, when the
estimate is negative.
For financial and capital variables, the signs and the mag-
nitude of the estimates can be read off from Table 1. Regard-
ing asset quality, the amount of loss reserves is significant and
is expected to be negatively related to the risk of bank fail-
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Variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
τ -0.148 0.189
Intercept 54.710 11.321 4.832 0.001 ***
Asset quality
Loan loss Reserves/Loans 0.067 0.045 1.480 0.138
Loans/Total assets -0.001 0.007 -0.168 0.866
Capital
Equity/Total Assets -0.042 0.057 -0.752 0.452
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.184 0.095 1.923 0.054 .
Total capital ratio 0.152 0.094 1.615 0.106
Operations
Return on Assets 0.194 0.228 0.853 0.393
Liquidity
Liquid Assets/Total Deposits -0.002 0.011 -0.173 0.862
Macroeconomic variables
GDP rate 16.601 5.561 2.985 0.002 **
Inflation rate -0.493 0.0831 -5.935 0.002 ***
Unemployment rate -1.133 0.353 -3.204 0.001 **
Interest rate -0.259 0.354 -0.730 0.465
Table 3: Signif. codes: 0 “***” 0.001 “**” 0.01 “*” 0.05 “.” 0.1 “ ” 1
Parameter estimates on 783 Italian banks from 1996 to 2011. The definition
of failure includes bankruptcy (no bank), dissolved (16 banks), in liquidation
(19 banks), merged or acquired (306 banks).
ure: the higher the coverage, the lower the risk, as expected;
the loans to assets ratio, instead, is positively related, in ac-
cordance with what expected, analogously to Arena (2008),
Ashcraft (2008) and Boyd et al. (2009).
Concerning capital, the signs of the estimates in Table 1
coincide with what expected for the leverage ratio, equity to
total assets, as in Arena (2008): higher solvency implies lower
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risk of failure. Simlilarly, both Basel II capital ratios are
negatively correlated with the risk of bank failures. Between
the two, the most significant is the Tier1 capital ratio.
Concerning liquidity we consider a deposit run off ra-
tio and look at what percentage of deposit and borrowings
could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. In contrast
with what expected (Arena, 2008), this ratio turns out to be
positively related to the risk of bank failure. Wagner (2006)
explains a similar finding by noting that, although higher as-
set liquidity directly benefits stability by facilitating assets
liquidation during crisis, it also makes crisis less costly for
banks. As a result, banks have an incentive to take on an
amount of new risk that more than offsets the positive direct
impact on stability.
In terms of operations, The ROA variable is, on the other
hand, negatively correlated with the probability of failure.
Finally, concerning macroeconomic variables, their effects
should be read off from Table 2. The estimates in Table 2
show that, while an increase in the GDP growth rate has
a negative effect on the risk of bank distress (it decreases
the risk), an increase in the inflation rate or in the unem-
ployment rate has a positive effect (they increase the risk).
Macroeconomic effects, therefore, are in line with the expec-
tations and this seems to be a valid conclusion, especially as
merger and acquisition events do prevail in the data behind
Table 2. Note finally that, among the macroeconomic vari-
ables, the interest rate does not seem to have a significant
effect on bank failure.
From a quantitative viewpoint, the magnitude of the co-
efficient estimates can be interpreted comparing the values
of the predicted default probabilities in (3.1) under different
values of the predictor to be interpreted. For example, con-
cerning capital variables, if a bank increases its leverage from
the regulatory minimum 3% by one point, at 4%, its default
probability decreases by about 1.5%; if, instead, it increases
the Tier1 ratio from the minimum 8% by one point, at 9%,
its default probability decreases by about 3%. Alternativey,
one can employ the estimated coefficients and approximate
the elasticity of the default probability with respect to an
explanatory variable using the linear approximation at the
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mean point: it turns out that such elasticity is equal to -1.16
for the leverage and -3.20 for the Tier1 ratio.
We now show that the GEV model, besides being more natural,
also outperforms logistic regression in terms of actual performance. It
is well known that the performance of models can be highly sensitive
to the data sample used for validation. To avoid embedding unwanted
sample dependency, models should be validated on observations that
are not included in the sample used to estimate the model. Hence,
we run out-of-sample validation to compare the GEV and the logis-
tic regression models. For this aim we consider the confusion matrix
(Giudici, and Figini, 2009) and the Area Under the Curve (AUC)
index that is built upon the confusion matrix (Hand, 2001). In addi-
tion, we consider the the H measure, as it overcomes the drawbacks of
the AUC, when class sizes and classification error costs are extremely
unbalanced (Hand, 2009 and 2010): both these characteristics are sat-
isfied in our context.
Finally, we consider the more conventional MAE and MSE mea-
sures, defined as:
MAE =
∑n
i=1 |yi − pii|
n
MSE =
∑n
i=1[yi − pii]2
n
.
All calculations are based on the same data partition, where 70%
of the observations is used as training set and 30% as validation set.
We shall report the false positive rate (the number of predicted de-
faults that do not occur, over the number of non-defaults) and the
false negative rate (the number of predicted non-defaults that actu-
ally default over the number of defaults) of the two models only for a
control sample.
It is more costly to classify a bank as good-performing when it
is in bankruptcy than to classify a bank as in bankruptcy when it
is safe. In particular, when a bankrupted bank is classified as good
performing by the model, irreversible actions may erroneously follow.
For instance, the economic system may keep lending to the bank. If
the bank becomes bankrupt, the lenders can loose their loans, with
important consequences on the stability of the economic system. On
the contrary, when a good-performing bank is classified as bankrupt,
reversible actions may be taken: for example, state aid can be granted,
but this can be returned when the good performance of the bank is
verified. For all these reasons, false negative errors are more important
than false positive errors.
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Table 3 shows the false positive and false negative errors, for the
two models, and the two alternative definitions of bank failures, for
the same control sample.
Table 3 about here
Model False positive rate False negative rate
Logistic regression on failures 0.0172 0.6225
GEV regression on failures 0.0732 0
Logistic regression on failures & mergers 0.0287 0.1538
GEV regression on failures & mergers 0.1724 0.0153
Table 4: Prediction errors of the logistic and the GEV regression models on
the control sample.
Table 3 shows that false negative errors for the logistic model are
much higher than the ones for the GEV model. Conversely, false
positive errors are slightly higher for the GEV than for the logistic
regression model. If, false negative errors are deemed more important,
as should be the case in our context, the GEV regression model clearly
outperforms logistic regression.
To further assess the predictive performance of the GEV regression
model and the logistic model for the two definitions of bank failure,
we have applied a non-parametric bootstrap method. Replications for
the bootstrap are handled by the plyr package of R-program. Since
the number of bank defaults is very low, the bootstrap is stratified:
the same number of bank defaults than in the original sample is se-
lected in each bootstrap replicate. Table 4 reports the means of the
H measure (Hand, 2009), AUC, MAE and MSE computed on 2,000
different bootstrap samples. The same number of replications is used
by Robin et al. (2011).
Table 4 about here
From Table 4 the GEV regression model shows MAE average er-
rors lower than the respective errors of the logistic regression model,
for both definitions of bank failure. The mean of MSE is lower for the
GEV model if failures are defined as failures and mergers, but it is
slightly higher than the logistic one for the first definition of default.
The average H measure for the GEV model is always higher than the
same measure for the logistic regression model. On the contrary, this
relationship is inverted if we consider the AUC. To understand this
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Definition of Error Models
default GEV regression Logistic regression
Failures MAE 0.0231 0.0321
MSE 0.0220 0.0219
AUC 0.7134 0.7889
H 0.0577 0.0529
Failures & Mergers MAE 0.0742 0.0758
MSE 0.0357 0.0378
AUC 0.8846 0.9380
H 0.0751 0.0743
Table 5: Average forecasting accuracy measures for different PDs on the
control sample.
discrepancy we remark that the H measure is equivalent to averaging
the misclassification loss over a cost ratio distribution which enables us
to better represent highly unbalanced misclassification costs. Instead,
this weight function in the AUC depends on the score distributions
(Hand, 2009), so that different classification models may be incoher-
ently evaluated and compared. To sum up, the H measure is more
reliable than the AUC in our context.
We have finally compared the performances of the two models,
the GEV model and the classical logistic regression one, by means of
the hypotheses test suggested by Hanley and NcNeil described in the
methodological Section. The approximate p-value of the test allows
us to reject the hypothesis that the logistic and the GEV models show
the same performance for both definitions of bank distress: the pure
default one and the one with mergers. This for the AUC as well as
the H measure. This points toward the significance of the overall
superiority of the GEV model.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a novel predictive model, aimed at efficiently esti-
mating the probability of default of financial institutions, based on a
generalised extreme value regression model. The model has been ap-
plied and tested on the Italian banking system, characterised by the
presence of a large number of banks, and a large number of unlisted
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and small banks.
Our main finding is that, when distress is defined only in terms
of actual default (bankruptcy, liquidation or closure), microeconomic
bank-specific variables are the most relevant predictors of bank fail-
ure; conversely, when distress is enlarged to include mergers and ac-
quisitions, macroeconomic factors come into play. More generally, our
results suggest that, coherently with the recent literature, both micro
and macro data sources should be included in the set of early warning
indicators aimed at predicting bank failures.
In terms of predictive performance, generalised extreme value re-
gression models perform better than logistic regression models, espe-
cially in terms of reducing the number of false negatives (i.e. bank
failures classified as “good”), which are key in an early warning per-
spective aimed at a preventive action.
We believe that the proposed model could substantially benefit
from the application to other contexts, and comparison with other
methods. For this purpose we underline that we have used data from
an accessible repository (Bankscope), and that our model is imple-
mented in the R software package BGEVA. Both the data and the
software are therefore accessible and replicable.
In particular, it may be interesting to apply our model to banking
systems where financial market data is available for a significant num-
ber of institutions, and compare our results with market based implied
probabilities of default. In the Italian system, this would not be fea-
sible, as the number of listed banks is very small and has changed
considerably over time.
Another possible extension of this paper is to embed it into a
systemic risk modelling framework. This especially in the light of the
fallacies of market-based models (see e.g. Idier et al. 2013). This
would include modelling explicitly correlation between banks, arising
from the unsecured interbank market or from common asset loans,
in the same economical system. A possibility is to explore spatial
regression models, as in Calabrese and Elkink (2012). Alternatively,
our model can complement the simulation-based model of De Lisa et
al. (2011).
Another extension could be, in a problem characterised by many
potential explanatory variables, to allow for model uncertainty, rather
than conditioning inferences on the single generalised linear model
chosen. This would call for a GEV model averaged Bayesian analy-
sis, following for instance the approach of Figini and Giudici (2013),
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endowed with prior elicitation as suggested in Kenny et al. (2013).
Finally, an important extension would be to build a dy-
namic GEV model, as in Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2007),
so to understand how creditworthiness deteriorates in time,
for example after stress events.
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